Draft · research

EDDIE UA – technical architecture and implementation requirements

Зміст статті / On this page (15)
  1. Objective and boundaries
  2. Proposed logical services C1–C10
  3. Data contracts (illustrative, not official endpoints)
  4. Separate official data from live controls
  5. Production safety requirements
  6. Engineering evidence and gaps
  7. Read the architecture as a customer journey
  8. EIC is an identifier, not a DNS domain or credential
  9. Permissions are multidimensional
  10. Every reading needs a provenance record
  11. Why fail-closed matters
  12. Three separate information and control domains
  13. Compare architectures rather than assuming federation wins
  14. Roadmap from research to a lawful pilot
  15. Read more

Objective and boundaries

EDDIE UA explores a hardware-agnostic, legally admissible federation of information access services: discover the competent technical source by EIC, verify legal entitlement, return quality-labelled metering series and audit each information event. The legally authoritative metering and settlement process remains with Ukraine's competent organisations.

EIC is a metering-point identifier, not a password and not literally a hierarchical DNS domain. A directory could return responsible node, effective date and authority epoch. This is a proposed engineering contract, not an official representation of Ukrenergo's system.

Proposed logical services C1–C10

C1 Directory and trust root

Resolve a metering point to a current technical information authority, maintain the authority epoch and verify approved node identity. Prevent concurrent contradictory assignments, support resilience and provide auditable changes.

C2 Identity and representation

Verify the customer organisation, authorised representative and lawful relationship to a metering point. Knowing company number plus EIC is insufficient. Source registries and acceptable evidence must be established by competent authorities.

C3 Permission and lawful-basis registry

Represent recipient, purpose, scope, legal basis, historical period, expiry, revocation and history. Not all processing is consent-based; stopping one permission does not automatically erase records held under a separate lawful basis.

C4 Metering point reference data

Hold only lawfully accessible EIC, status, confirmed source, effective dates and market relationships. Changes of customer or representative should invalidate access when appropriate.

C5 Metered data store or adapter

Serve interval start/end, unit, value, quality, source, revision and publication timestamp. Distinguish validated, provisional, substituted, corrected and unavailable values. Absence of a reading is not zero.

C6 Data-access gateway

Enforce entitlement per request, rate limits and anti-enumeration controls. Return reason categories and correlation identifiers without revealing confidential metering data.

C7 Authority transfer and reconciliation

Use monotonic epoch fencing, immutable snapshots, checksums, receiver acknowledgement, controlled authority switching, durable journal and crash recovery. A technical node switch must not change the supplier, BRP or statutory status of settlement data.

C8 Audit and compliance

Provide reconstruction of relevant grants, requests, corrections and transfers to an appropriately authorised reviewer. Public observability must not expose sensitive consumer profiles.

C9 Synthetic conformance environment

Offer invented metering points, negative tests, revoke and replay cases, correction and schema migration, failures and competing-node scenarios. Passing the sandbox does not grant market accreditation.

C10 Participant portal

A future customer view could display active permissions and access history; integrators see onboarding status and schema versions; lawful supervisors may review limited incident and operational evidence.

Data contracts (illustrative, not official endpoints)

MeteringPoint: EIC, authority, status, effective timestamp, epoch. Permission: id, recipient, scope, legal basis, purpose, validity and revoked_at. Reading: EIC, interval boundaries, value, unit, quality, revision, provenance. Transfer: source/target node, epochs, snapshot integrity, state and completion time. AuditEvent: actor, action, outcome and correlation id.

The versioned synthetic OpenAPI in the private EDDIE repository is a research artifact. Do not confuse its URL paths or field names with deployed DataHub APIs.

Separate official data from live controls

Commercial metering: validated official data, settlement relationships, approved corrections and designated legal responsibilities. Local DER management: second-scale PCS/BMS/BESS/PV/charger/HVAC telemetry and commands governed by site controller and hardware safety. Wesfin Edge and other EMS systems must never rely on DataHub as an emergency dispatch or safety channel.

Production safety requirements

Independent PKI/mTLS, robust authentication/authorisation, key rotation, revocation, privacy minimisation, replay protection, append-only evidence, secure storage, signed receipts, consistent directory state, tested network partitions and a properly audited incident response process. Latency, availability and RTO/RPO targets require realistic load profiles and measured service obligations.

Engineering evidence and gaps

The research prototype runs a directory and two nodes as separate localhost HTTP processes with independent SQLite databases and synthetic durable-operation recovery. It has meaningful test coverage for some failure paths. It is not a real multi-organisation deployment, not proof of Byzantine or split-brain resistance, not officially connected to metering data and not suitable for customer records without further legal and security work.

Read the architecture as a customer journey

Ten components can sound abstract. Imagine instead that a factory asks an independent energy specialist for a twelve-month flexibility study. A valid request needs a verified representative, lawful relationship to the metering point, EIC, data period, recipient and processing purpose. The system must establish rights before it identifies the appropriate technical data source and returns any metering records.

A directory answers where to seek the competent source. A permission service answers whether the recipient has the necessary legal entitlement. A metered-data adapter returns the reading with proper quality and provenance. An audit trail records which decision was made and on what grounds. Knowing an EIC cannot replace any of those steps.

EIC is an identifier, not a DNS domain or credential

The analogy with DNS concerns discovering a responsible source through a stable identifier. EIC is not a hierarchical internet domain, and possession of an EIC gives no authority to serve official settlement data. Legal competence must be established separately.

Our proposed authority epoch is an incrementing version of technical responsibility. Following a permitted A → B transfer, stale actions by A should be rejected. Proving this property in a real distributed environment under network partitions is harder than passing one-machine tests. It remains an engineering research objective.

Permissions are multidimensional

A permission or other lawful basis can be scoped by recipient, data category, metering point, purpose, historical period, expiry and revocation. It is not one global on/off switch. A legitimate energy auditor does not automatically gain permission to resell a complete customer profile or give it to a connected trading company.

Some processing may be lawful without relying on consent, for example under specific statutory obligations. Revoking one permission should therefore block new requests under that permission, without pretending to nullify every independently lawful duty. The legal rule must drive software behaviour, not the reverse.

Every reading needs a provenance record

The bare number 120 kWh is not adequate. It must be tied to an interval, direction, unit, source, quality status, version and publication time. Was it measured, substituted, provisional, validated or corrected? Which earlier reading did the correction supersede? Was the interval affected by a daylight-saving change?

The data model needs half-open intervals, consistent time handling and explicit absence. A missing value is not zero consumption. Distinguishing quality status is particularly important when the same customer operates solar PV and storage and both exports and imports electricity.

Why fail-closed matters

An unavailable permissions directory cannot be treated as implicit authorisation to reveal protected customer data. The research model favours denial or a controlled PENDING state when new entitlements cannot be verified. Future caching or offline policies would require carefully bounded signed evidence and explicit legal rules.

Similarly, moving technical responsibility from A to B requires a verifiable snapshot, integrity proof, acknowledgements, monotonic epoch and recoverable journal. The local prototype covers some of these behaviours but not all multi-host failure cases or independent cryptographic trust.

Three separate information and control domains

First is official commercial metering and settlement, managed by legally authorised parties. Second is interoperable information access for eligible services, which EDDIE UA is researching. Third is fast on-site telemetry and physical control of DER such as batteries, solar inverters, chargers and industrial loads.

A local industrial controller such as Wesfin Edge must respect hardware, BMS and grid safety independently of any cloud service. DataHub must not be treated as the real-time PCS dispatch channel, and on-site sensor readings must not automatically acquire official settlement status.

Compare architectures rather than assuming federation wins

A central, documented, geo-redundant API may satisfy the requirement at lower cost. A lawful federation with independent nodes may improve adaptability, competition or resilience, but adds a trust directory, key lifecycle, audits and distributed recovery complexity. Multiple statutory AKOs would require a separate legal reform.

The responsible architecture must be selected through law, threat modelling, measured availability, cost and independent conformance testing, not by choosing the most decentralised diagram.

Roadmap from research to a lawful pilot

Start with synthetic identity, permission, quality, correction, audit and negative tests. Move to independently hosted nodes, organisational certificates, signed records and partition testing. Only then negotiate a limited pilot with a competent data provider under approved agreements, followed by external security assessment and a five-year comparative economic analysis.

EDDIE UA's proposed schema and API field names are never official Ukrenergo DataHub endpoints unless independently verified through the proper source.

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